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PPP scheme are penetrating into Asian EMDEs where infrastructure demand is 
high. And, the infrastructure market in Asia is expected to expand and PPP 
scheme will play an important role. Although past researches have mainly 
focused on the way to maximise IRR and NPV in the context of PPP scheme, the 
relationship between risk factors and capital structure is not investigated 
completely. To clarify its relationship will bring benefits for the future infrastructure 
market in Asian EMDEs. This study evaluates the risk factors with the greatest 
impact on capital structure, illustrates the importance of demand risk, and assess 
the relationships between capital structure and risk factors from the viewpoint of 
financial cost. Also, this study focuses on megaprojects in transport and power 
sector, which have a large impact on the EMDEs’ economy. This research 
methods are comprehensive literature reviews and mixed method included 
multiple linear regression analysis of secondary data and semi-structured 
interviews. The main findings of this research are 1) Demand and financial risks 
are correlated with capital structure in power megaprojects, 2) Demand risk are 
the key element to make financial decision, 3) Demand forecast in transport 
sectors has optimism bias and the bias derive from the consultant business 
custom, 4) Capital structure and risk evaluation affect financial cost of SPV, 5) 
Loan interest rate does not represent demand risk probability completely. 
Keywords: Public-private partnership, Risk factors, Capital structure, Financial 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A PPP is the one of the ways to deliver infrastructure projects. Paraphrasing from 
Weber and Alfen (2010); the characteristics of PPP schemes are (1) they usually 
require formation of a SPV/SPC; (2) they are funded using highly leveraged cash 
flow based lending, structured so as to keep the debt off balance sheet; (3) there 
will be a complex risk sharing structure between the public and private sector 
participants; (4) the contractual structures used reflect the complexity (Weber and 
Alfen, 2010). Hence, appropriate risk-sharing structures and soundness of 
forecast cash flows are a key for successful PPP projects.  
Risk share structure can be represented by capital structure and agreements 
between equity holders, lenders and other subcontractors. As mentioned, the 
capital structure of PPP projects generally is high leverage, with 70-90% debt 
ratios being typical (Finnerty, 2007; The National Audit Office, 2015; Weber and 
Alfen, 2010; Yescombe, 2007). This capital structure should be balanced between 
the perspective of equity holders and lenders. Equity holders seek higher 
leverage to maximise its IRR and lenders want higher equity to need the 
commitment of equity holders (Weber and Alfen, 2010; Zhang and Asce, 2005). 
Hence, debt-equity ratio would be the result of compromise between SPV and 
the lenders based on lenders’ risk, project risk, industry and market 
characteristics (PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PARTNERSHIP LEGAL RESOURCE 
CENTER, 2016). Also, excessive risks born by private party would make lenders 
reduce their loan amount and then more equity would be needed (PPP 
Knowledge Lab, 2017). Therefore, equity holders seek an appropriate risk share 
structure and increase the leverage of a project. 
In terms of the trend of PPP market, it will expand to EMDEs. The scale of 
investment and the number of PPP projects have been increased from 1990 
(Figure 1). In terms of the geographic viewpoint, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean have been main market among EMDEs. Asian Development Bank 
stated that $1.7 trillion should be mobilized annually to meet infrastructure 
demands in Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2017). Additionally, PPP scheme 
have been used mainly by China and India while its scheme begins to establish 
in Southeast Asia (Deep et al., 2019). According to The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2019), Thailand, Philippines, India, Viet Nam and Indonesia are ranked as 
mature or developed PPP environments.  
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Looking at sectors, transport and power sectors have been the main areas of 
activity within EMDEs (Figure 2). These two sectors have had over 80% of total 
PPP project investment last twenty years. And, transport sector tends to be large 
scale because ratio of transport sector in the number of project was larger than 
the ratio in investment amount. Also, the share of megaprojects, which is 
generally defined as a project over $1 billion, has been 30-50% from 2008 while 
its number of megaprojects has been low, less than 10%. Hence, megaproject 
market could be minor but its impact on economy is significant.  
 
 
Figure 2: Ratio of PPP investment in sectors (developed from the World Bank data) 
Figure 1: PPP investment in regions (developed from World Bank data) 
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1.2 Research scope 
There is still a research gap in the relationship of capital structure and risk factors. 
Researchers agree to capital structure being a most important part for successful 
PPP/PFI projects (Chen et al., 2015; Demirag et al., 2011; Iyer and Sagheer, 
2012; Weber and Alfen, 2010). And, several studies (Bakatjan et al., 2003; Iyer 
and Sagheer, 2012; Yun et al., 2009) established models for the optimal capital 
structure for PPP/PFI projects to maximise IRR and net present value (NPV) of 
the projects. However, there are fewer researches to investigate the relationship 
between risk factors and capital structure (i.e. de Marco et al., 2017; Du et al., 
2018). While the capital structure of a PPP is related to risk factors as mentioned 
in 1.1 (PPP Knowledge Lab, 2017; PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PARTNERSHIP LEGAL 
RESOURCE CENTER, 2016; Weber and Alfen, 2010; Zhang and Asce, 2005). 
We still do not know fully to what extent these individual risk factors affect capital 
structures of PPP projects. And, optimal capital structure can be optimal financial 
cost to form SPV. So, this investigation could bring practical benefit because with 
more data risk factors can be ranked so as to optimise a preferred capital 
structure. 
The investigation of risk factors for PPP/PFI have been carried out and there are 
several empirical findings of the risk factors although these investigations have 
not focused on the scale of project. The risk evaluation for large projects like 
megaproject tends to become speculative process (Asenova and Beck, 2003), 
and so there could be some differences between megaprojects and standard 
scale projects in terms of risk evaluation. 
To narrow the research focus, this research focuses on infrastructure 
megaprojects in Asian countries in the power and transport sectors. Transport 
and power sectors are main market in EMDEs (Figure 1).  
In summary, this research would shed the light on how to evaluate the risk of the 
PPP megaprojects in Asian countries, especially in transport and power sectors, 
and investigate the relationship between capital structure and risk factors from 




1.3 Overall aim and Objectives 
1.3.1 Overall aim 
The overall aim of this research is to analyse the relationship between capital 
structure and risk factors in megaprojects, focusing on these types of project in 
Asian transport and power sectors. This is because the Asian market has a large 
share of PPP investments (Figure 1) and transport and power sectors are 
important sectors for emerging economies and PPP investments concentrate on 
both sectors (Figure 2). 
1.3.2 Objectives 
There are some aspects for this report to achieve overall aim. This report needs 
to sort out the risk factors which influence the capital structure. There are several 
risks of PPP projects while this does not imply that all risks can affect the capital 
structure. Also, this report considers demand risk intensively among the risk 
factors and the perspectives of financial cost. Demand risk is a major risk to be 
considered for the project’s cash flow and this risk evaluation can be a significant 
factor for capital structure. Additionally, financial cost is also an important factor 
for planning cash flow of PPP projects and value for money. The relationship 
between risk factors and capital structure illustrates the impact of the risk factors 
on financial cost because capital structure is generally correlated to the financial 
cost.  
Therefore, the objectives of this research are to:  
1. Identify the relevant risk factors (the independent variables) which directly 
impact the dependent variables in capital structure used in the SPVs  
2. Critically evaluate by sensitivity analysis those variables with greatest impact 
on financing structures 
3. Demonstrate demand risk is a key factor in each of the sectors (power and 
transport) in Asian megaprojects 
4. Assess the relationships between capital structure and risk factors in terms 
of impact via financing costs 
The first objective will form the core of the literature review. The risk factors are 
set to be independent variables and dependent variables are the figures of capital 
structure, such as debt-equity ratio. The analysis of relationship of these variables 
develops the other objectives and this analysis measures the impact of risk 
5 
 
factors on capital structure. The third objective develops a deep understanding of 
the impact of demand risk on PPP transport or power projects financially. The 
demand risk would be a significant factor for cash flow during operation period. 
Thus, this research will establish the importance of evaluation of demand risk for 
power and transport PPP projects. In this context, this research will identify some 
differences and similarities of the treatment of demand risks between these two 
sectors. Finally, the fourth objective provides meaning insights of financial cost in 
the context of relationship between capital structure and risk factors. Capital 
structure generally represents the composition of equity and debt, and financial 
cost, such as cost of equity and debt, depends on the balance of this composition.  
For evaluating the impact of risk variable on capital structure quantitatively in 
the objective 2, the null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis (H1) is 
following: 
H0: There is no significant correlation of a risk factor with debt-equity ratio 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Evaluation of risk factors 
PPP projects generally involve various risks and one of significant factors to 
deliver PPP projects successfully is optimal risk share structure. According to 
agency theory, an appropriate company’s risk structure solves agency problems 
which reduce efficiency of business (Brealey et al., 1996). They explained that 
agency problems derive from different interest of various parties and so optimal 
contractual arrangements gives proper incentives to all parties to act efficiently. 
According to Irwin (2007), a party which can be in charge of a risk 1) influences 
the corresponding risk factors, 2) influences the sensitivity of project value to the 
corresponding risk, or 3) absorbs the risk. Thus, some risk can be retransferred 
from the SPV to third parties, such as subcontractors, insurance companies and 
end-users (Yescombe, 2007, chap. 14). However, finer subdivisions and 
allocation of risks increase transaction cost. Demirag et al. (2011) stated that 
involvement of many parties increases risk of management. Bing et al. (2005) 
identified risk factors to develop the understanding of optimal risk share structure 
between public and private sectors in the UK. They categorized these risks into 
three groups, Macro, Meso and Micro, and concluded that meso level risks, which 
is directly associated with the project, should be allocated to private sector, 
relationship risks and natural risks should be shared and some macro level risks 
should remain in public party. However, the risk share structure could depend on 
the economic and legal condition of the country. Hwang et al. (2013) researched 
risk share preference in Singapore and its results illustrates that the risk share 
structure, especially Macro level risks, is different from Bing et al. (2005). 
However, both studies concluded that demand, supply, construction and 
operational risk can be primary allocated to the private party. Additionally, 
Yescombe (2007, chap. 14) illustrated a general risk factors matrix where some 
risks are similar with the above studies while supply and relationship risks are not 
covered (Table 1). In the context of megaprojects, design, legal and/or political, 
contractual, construction, operation and maintenance, labour, social, financial 
risks have been identified (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014b). To compare with other 
studies above, risk category does not depend on the scale of projects. Bear in 
mind, these studies mentioned above integrated the perspectives of public party, 
equity holders and lenders. 
Lenders generally have the way to assess risk factors. The risk analysis of banks 
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uses a risk matrix including risk categories and their allocation to the parties to 
decide credit risk rating for a transaction (Asenova and Beck, 2003). Also, lenders 
tend to assess the risks according to its worst-case scenario which is the different 
way from the public party and the equity holders who normally uses weighted 
risks according to its probability (Yescombe, 2007, chap. 14). Practically, Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s established the way to evaluate a project finance and 
these models are decomposed into several risk factors. The Moody’s model 
evaluates market position, predictability of net cash flows, DSCR and operating 
risk, such as technology and operator and sponsor experience (Moody’s investor 
service, 2019). And, Technology and design construction risk, performance and 
market risk (demand risk) and country risk is incorporated into the S&P model 
(Standard & Poor’s rating services, 2014).  
Demand, supply, construction and operation risks are major bankability for PPP 
projects from lenders’ perspective. As mentioned above, these risks can be 
transferred to the private party and so private lenders should scrutinize these 
risks. Owolabi et al. (2020) investigated the four risks as critical factors for the 
decision of banking, and prioritised 18 factors out of 36 bankability criteria. 
Lenders’ bankability criteria are obviously more specific corresponding to the 
risks (Table 1). Also, their result shows that lenders emphasize adequate cash 
flow, partners’ quality and contractual matters. This argument would be supported 
by some past studies. Reputation of partners are a significant factor to select 
them (Demirag et al., 2011). And, Farquharson et al. (2011) described that 
lenders have a strong interest in financial strength and technical capability of the 
subcontractors. For construction contractor, its scale of business can be matter 
and comparison between the annual turnover and the amount of subcontract is 
an important criterion to show adequate financial strength (Yescombe, 2007, 
chap. 14). Also, in Asia power sector, credit quality of suppliers and off-takers are 
the most critical factors for establishing SPV (Chowdhury et al., 2012). 
Additionally, Zhang and Asce (2005) stated that long-term commitment of equity 
holders is essential for effective and efficient development of PPP projects. This 
factor is listed in bankability of demand and operation risks in Table 1. 
Furthermore, Demirag et al. (2011) concluded that design and development is a 
highest risk in pre-financial close and construction phase, and finance is a second 
highest risk in pre-financial close, construction and operation phases from the 
financiers’ viewpoint. But this research did not distinguish financiers from equity 
holders or lenders and so this viewpoint could be comprehensive although this 
gives the insight that risk to be focused can vary according to the project phase. 
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The risk evaluation of PPP megaprojects is practically difficult. Its risk evaluation 
could become a speculative process (Asenova and Beck, 2003). Also, cost 
overrun and delay are common for megaprojects, and 9 of 10 megaprojects faced 
cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2014). Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014b) also illustrated, 
in the case study, that the profitability (NPV and IRR) of the megaprojects in Spain 
would be negative without public grants. Denicol et al. (2020) stated that this high 
rate failure derives from its size, complexity, uncertainty, urgency, and institutional 
structure in megaprojects. This high uncertainty could make risk evaluation 
difficult. For example, the construction period of megaprojects tends to be longer 
than ordinary projects and so evaluating demand risk should consider much 
future than normal projects’ case. Also, Flyvbjerg et al. (2014) stated that 
optimism bias is a common source of error to forecast demand of transport 
megaprojects. Therefore, the mitigation measure such as off-taker contract and 
operational agreement is preferable for lenders, which are listed in bankability 
criteria of Owolabi et al. (2020). In the case study of waste water treatment facility 
in Scotland, performance guarantee tends to work preferably for lenders to give 
sufficient credit support (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). Additionally, Denicol et al. 
(2020) pointed out that the complexity of megaprojects is caused by its dynamics 
of megaproject system and relationship with external environment. Regarding to 
dynamics of megaproject system, selecting qualified partners can be critical. 
Kardes et al. (2013) stated that a robust collaboration among partners is 
significant for megaproject success. For management of megaprojects, technical 
risk should be considered. Boateng et al. (2015) found technical risk as the 
riskiest for megaprojects. While this research is case study and its result cannot 
be generalised, technical risk can be involved in megaprojects, especially 
developing countries. Ezzat Othman (2013) identified technical challenges as 
one of the challenges to implement mega construction projects in developing 
countries. This technical competence of subcontractors can be measured by their 
experience to implement similar type of projects, working experience in the 




Table 1: Comparison of risk factors 









Owolabi et al. (2019)  
  (Detail bankability criteria) 
Macro Political Unstable government ✓ ✓       
Macro Political Expropriation or nationalisation of assets ✓ ✓       
Macro Political  Poor public decision-making process ✓         
Macro Political Strong political opposition/hostility ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Political Lack of support from government   ✓       
Macro Political Corruption and bribery   ✓       
Macro Financial Poor financial market ✓ ✓       
Macro Financial  Inflation rate volatility ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Financial Interest rate volatility ✓ ✓ ✓     
Meso Financial  Availability of finance ✓ ✓       
Meso Financial Financial attraction of project to investors ✓ ✓       
Meso Financial High finance costs ✓ ✓       
Macro Economics Influential economic events ✓         
Macro Legal Legislation change ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Legal Change in tax regulation ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Legal Industrial regulatory change ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Social Lack of tradition of private provision of public services ✓         
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Owolabi et al. (2019)  
  (Detail bankability criteria) 
Macro Social Level of public opposition to project ✓ ✓ ✓     
Meso Social Land acquisition (site availability) ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Natural  Force majeure ✓ ✓       
Macro Natural Geotechnical conditions ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Natural Weather ✓ ✓       
Macro Natural Environment ✓ ✓ ✓     
Macro Natural Archeology and fossils     ✓     
Meso Residual   Residual risks ✓ ✓ ✓     
Meso Design Delay in project approvals and permits ✓ ✓ ✓     
Meso Design Design deficiency ✓ ✓ ✓     
Meso Design Unproven engineering techniques ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Tried-and Tested technology for the construction of 
project. 
Meso Design Scope variation   ✓ ✓     
Meso Design Late design changes ✓   ✓     
Meso Construction Construction cost overrun ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
‐ Fixed Price Turn Key (FPTK) contract 
‐ Pre- completion guarantee or full financial guarantee 
from the sponsor at construction 
‐ Delay in start-up insurance 
Meso Construction Construction time delay ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Meso Construction Poor quality workmanship ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Meso Construction Excessive contract variation ✓     ✓ 
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Owolabi et al. (2019)  
  (Detail bankability criteria) 
Meso Construction Site safety and security   ✓   ✓  
Meso Construction Contractors' quality     ✓ ✓ 
- Construction contractor with years of experience of 
successful completion of project finance 
- Construction contractor with financial strength 
- Construction contractor with a liability insurance cover 
Meso Construction Technical correctness       ✓ 
Sponsor to engage Independent Technical Consultant 
(ITC) 
Meso Construction Contractor bonding       ✓   
Meso Construction Debt Buy Out       ✓   
Meso Construction Access, rights of way $ easements     ✓     
Meso Construction Connections to the site     ✓     
Meso Construction Disposal of surplus land     ✓     
Meso Operation Operation cost overrun ✓ ✓     
Robust cover ratios (Annual Debt Service Cover Ratio 
and Loan Life Cover Ratio) 
Meso Operation  Low operating productivity ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ‐ O&M contractor’s competence and financial strength 
‐ Experienced and skilled operation and Maintenance 
staff within the SPV 
Meso Operation Maintenance costs higher than expected ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Owolabi et al. (2019)  
  (Detail bankability criteria) 
Meso Operation Maintenance more frequent than expected ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Meso Operation Soundness of Operations & Maintenance (O&M) contract       ✓ 
‐ Long-term Operations & Maintenance (O&M) 
contract/Performance Based Contract 
‐ Existence of Lender right to remove O&M operator and 
revoke contract due to performance deficiency 
Meso Operation O&M Operator's Guarantee from Parent Company           
Meso Supply Material/labour availability ✓ ✓       
Meso Supply Soundness of contracts with suppliers       ✓ 
‐ Existence of fair hedge contract on supplies of project 
raw materials 
‐ Non-Supply Penalty to supplier 
Meso Supply Insolvency/default of sub-contractors or suppliers ✓         
Meso Supply Quality of suppliers       ✓ 
Supply contract with a reliable and experienced input 
supplier 
Meso Demand Level of demand for project ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Traffic/revenue forecast from an independent expert 
consultant 
Meso Demand Operational revenues below expectation ✓   ✓     
Meso Demand Soundness of contract/agreement about demand     ✓ ✓ 
‐ Existence of Shadow toll contract arrangement 
‐ Government Guarantee of cash flow shortfall. 
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Owolabi et al. (2019)  
  (Detail bankability criteria) 
Meso Demand Robust cash flow     ✓ ✓ Predictably robust project cash flows 
Micro Relationship Organisation and co-ordination risk ✓ ✓       
Micro Relationship Inadequate experience in PPP/PFI ✓ ✓       
Micro Relationship Inadequate distribution of responsibilities and risks ✓ ✓       
Micro Relationship Inadequate distribution of authority in partnership ✓ ✓       
Micro Relationship Differences in working method and know-how between partners ✓ ✓       
Micro Relationship Lack of commitment from either partner ✓ ✓       
Micro Relationship  Third Party Tort Liability ✓         
Micro Relationship Staff Crises ✓         
Micro Relationship Excessive contract variation   ✓       




2.2 The relationship of capital structure with risk factors 
Capital structure of SPV is one important characteristic of PPP projects. There 
are public and private party perspectives to consider the benefit of establishing 
SPV to finance projects. From public sector’s viewpoint, there are three benefits: 
1) transferring risks to private sector, 2) off-balance sheet finance, 3) public body 
can invest without sufficient budgets (The National Audit Office, 2018). So, public 
party considers PPP scheme as an efficient way to finance social or economic 
infrastructure. The benefit to establish SPV is explained by agency theory from 
private sectors’ perspective. Brealey et al. (1996) explained that arranging for 
manager to take an equity stake with the project company makes the investment 
efficient because monitoring the incomplete contracts by shareholders 
themselves is costly. Also, capital structure of SPV is highly leveraged, generally 
70-80% (Weber and Alfen, 2010; Yescombe, 2007). Generally, the major 
determinants of corporate debt ratio are bankruptcy costs and tax shield benefit 
(Chen et al., 1997). Higher debt ratio increases bankruptcy costs while the firm 
gets higher tax shield benefit. However, project finance has a unique feature 
different from corporate finance, which leads to its high leverage. This is 
bankruptcy remoteness, which SPV is financially separate from sponsors and 
then bankruptcy of both sides does not affect each other significantly (Sainati et 
al., 2017). So, the addition of bankruptcy remoteness to tax-shield benefit give an 
incentive for sponsors to make SPV being high leverage. However, leverage ratio 
can be different in individual sectors, such as transport sector’s median 77% and 
power sector’s one 70% (Finnerty, 2007). Each sector has different profitability 
and risks and these factors might result in different leverage ratio, but still their 
leverage is high. But there is a drawback of project finance, which is high 
transactional cost compared to traditional corporate finance because of the 
complexity and incomplete of its concession contracts (Sarmento and 
Renneboog, 2016). They also stated that this is one of the reasons to transfer 
risks to others to make the investment more efficient.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, capital structure of PPP projects can be decided by 
balancing interests of equity holders and lenders. The elements to determine 
capital structure are profitability, cash flow, risk share structure, creditworthiness 
of parties (Finnerty, 2007; Weber and Alfen, 2010). However, these elements are 
interrelated each other. For example, inappropriate risk share structure can 
increase cost of debt and result in low profitability, and this consequence affects 
cash flow management. In terms of financial cost, optimal capital structure can 
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be preferable. While equity holders prefer high leverage, high leverage of SPV 
reduces its creditworthiness and results in high cost of debt (Weber and Alfen, 
2010). However, high equity ratio of SPV capital, which is preferable for lenders, 
also increases financial cost because cost of equity is normally higher than cost 
of debt (Zhang and Asce, 2005). Therefore, optimal capital structure leads to 
optimal financial cost. However, in the report of House of Commons Treasury 
Committee (2011), one British contractor stated that demand risk leads to the 
increase in cost of debt. This report did not specify the reason, but this may imply 
that demand risk could affect financial cost more significantly than other risks and 
financial cost does not depends on only capital structure. Blanc-Brude and 
Strange (2007) identified that cost of debt depends on systematic risk, such as 
demand risk while they stated that practitioners agreed that cost of debt is simply 
the price of market. Dias and Ioannou (1995) explained theoretically existence of 
debt capacity of project finance and owning debt over optimal level reducing 
equity holders’ return and NPV of the project. This implies that excessive high 
leverage decrease benefits of equity holders. There are some studies to establish 
the model for optimal capital structure to maximise IRR and NPV (i.e. Feng et al., 
2017; Iyer and Sagheer, 2012). Also, there is another perspective of capital 
structure from public sector viewpoint. Chang (2013) illustrated that excessively 
small equity capital in SPV can give strong bargaining powers to the equity 
holders in negotiation and so the project can be exposed to hold-up problem. This 
can cause cost overrun and delay of delivery of the project, and so an excessive 
high leverage capital structure is not preferable for public owners. Thus, public 
party ensures a reasonable equity ratio for this reason. 
Risk factors could affect capital structure of SPV. de Marco et al. (2017) identified 
that low government effectiveness (high political risk), long construction period 
(high construction risk) and large size of project are negatively correlated to equity 
ratio by assessing 52 world bank projects. However, the variables of this research 
were political risk, financial risk, construction risk and operational risk, and so this 
research does not evaluate demand and supply risks. And, construction and 
operation risks are based on investment size, construction period and 
concessionaire period, and these parameter does not represent these risks 
comprehensively. Although these parameters are important the financial and 
technical competence should be considered for evaluating construction and 
operation risks comprehensively as mentioned in CH. 2.1. Also, CORIELLI et al. 
(2010) revealed that having O&M agreement increases leverage ratio only if O&M 
contractors are other than sponsors, and existence of off-take agreement 
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decreases leverage ratio if that agreement would be signed by other than 
sponsors. This implied that O&M agreement with the contractor other than 
sponsors could mitigate operational risks while off-take agreement with the 
contractor out of sponsors is preferable for lenders. Construction subcontractors 
generally are major sponsor in PPP project so that there are conflicts of interest 
(i.e. risk of inappropriate contractual agreement, such as high bid price for 
construction) (Yescombe, 2007, chap. 14), but this could also be the case in the 
context of O&M agreement. Contrary to these findings above, Du et al. (2018) 
argued that risk factors do not show high importance in equity ratio compared 
with other factors (external situation, project condition, and government support) 
according to their quantitative model and risk should be combined with other 
factors. The risks of this study also do not integrate risk factors comprehensively 
because they focused on construction, operational, social and financial risk. The 
reviews of studies about capital structure and risk factors illustrate that 
construction and operational risks are examined in terms of capital structure while 
demand and supply risks are not focused even though these risks are also 
significant for risk assessment.  
 
2.3 Demand risk as key factor for PPP projects 
Demand risk is clearly an important factor for project finance. This demand risk 
is generally analysed through sensitivity testing and scenario testing (Adler et 
al., 2014; Bull et al., 2015). However, the demand forecast, which is the base 
information of demand risk analysis, is rarely achieved in transport sector 
(Flyvbjerg, 2008). According to Flyvbjerg et al. (2007), actual traffic was about 
50% lower than the forecast in railway from 1969 and 1998, and about 50% of 
the road projects have more than 20% difference between actual and forecast. 
Thus, transport projects are normally regarded as risky investment compared to 
other infrastructure.  
This inaccuracy of traffic forecast has not been improved for 30 years and it’s 
derived from uncertainties of trip distribution and optimistic bias (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2007). For the former, the forecast based on user data and policy does not go 
along with real world because of the change of the policy, and in the later, 
policy-maker who is a transport promoter tend to overestimate the demand 
forecast. In terms of trip distribution, PPIAF (2009) illustrated that transport 
improvement, such as construction of new highway, can affect cost of travel on 
various transport route. This is one of the causes to change of trip distribution. 
17 
 
Moreover, although future demand of traffic volume in toll roads is based on 
forecast of traffic factors (economic and population growth and employment 
etc.), this historical relationship may not be applied to long term forecasting (Bull 
et al., 2015). They stated that the accuracy of long-term forecasting should 
decline due to uncertainty of forecast and the ability of the historical 
relationship. Therefore, economic factors historically related to traffic volume do 
not represent the future traffic fully. Also, tolling culture can be another factor for 
uncertainty of toll road project especially in the regions where tolling has not 
been used in the past (Lemp et al., 2009; PPIAF, 2009).  
The existence of optimism bias for traffic forecast is also supported by Lemp et 
al. (2009). They also described that toll road forecast tend to be affected by 
optimism bias and that bias affects parameter and input assumptions for 
modelling calibration and application. Bull et al. (2015) also pointed out this 
point and they recommended that a close review of traffic forecast analysis is 





Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
Chapter 2 addressed the first objective of this study and identified the gap 
regarding to risk factors and capital structure of PPP megaprojects. Objective 2, 
3 and 4 would be addressed by using mixed methodology using primary data 
collected via semi-structured interviews, and secondary data available. Thus, this 
research will take collection and analysis of data obtained from public web 
sources, and this study will gather empirical data to be analysed to have a round 
view regarding to the third and fourth objectives. This chapter will provide the 
details of the research strategy to achieve the objectives mentioned above and 
the ways to collect and analyse the data. 
 
3.2 Data collection 
The sample framework of this research are PPP megaprojects (investment 
amount over $1 billion) in transport (Road, Railway, Port and Airport) and power 
(Electricity and Natural gas) sectors in Asian EMDEs.  
This study uses two data collection techniques; secondary data and interview. In 
the quantitative analysis, debt-equity ratio represents capital structure of SPV, 
and risk factors to be focused are construction, operation, supply and demand 
risks. These six risks are measured by the parameters according to the past 
researches and gathered from publicly data source (Table 2). In terms of financial 
risk, a high score of financial risk means a high financial risk because a high 
inflation rate leads to a high project cost (de Marco et al., 2017). And, regarding 
to construction risk, ratio of the total investment amount to the annual turnover of 
construction subcontractor measures the financial strength of the contractor. 
Yescombe (2007, chap. 14) stated that a comparison between the annual 
turnover and the amount of subcontract is an important criterion to show 
adequate financial strength. Table 3 shows the way to evaluate political risk and 




Table 2: Risk factor to be used 
Risk Parameter 
Political risk Standard & Poor’s rating, Fitch, Moody’s, DBRS 




Construction subcontractor financial strength  
(Ratio of the total investment amount to the annual 
turnover of construction subcontractor) 
Operation risk 
Operation period 
Experience as a main operator 
Supply risk Experience as suppliers 
Demand risk 
Existence of government guarantee regarding to 
demand 





Table 3: Political risk evaluation 
Political risk S&P Moody's Fitch DBRS 
9 
AAA Aaa AAA AAA 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ AA(high) 
8.6 AA Aa2 AA AA 
8.3 AA- As3 AA- AA(low) 
7.9 A+ A1 A+ A(high) 
7.6 A A2 A A 
7.3 A- A3 A- A(low) 
6.9 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBB(high) 
6.6 BBB Baa2 BBB BBB 
6.3 BBB- Baa3 BBB- BBB(low) 
5.9 BB+ Ba1 BB+ BB(high) 
5.6 BB Ba2 BB BB 
5.3 BB- Ba3 BB- BB(low) 
4.9 B+ B1 B+ B(high) 
4.6 B B2 B B 
4.3 B- B3 B- B(low) 
 
Table 4: Operation, supply and demand risk evaluation 
Risk category Parameter Score Condition 
Operation  
risk 
Experience as a 
main operator 
2 
Having both industrial and the 
local experience 
1 
Having either industrial or the 
local experience 






More than half of suppliers with 
local experience or branches 
1 
Less than half of suppliers with 
local experience or branches 






1 Having government guarantee 
0 No government guarantee 
Existence of off-
taker contract 
1 Having off-taker contract 
0 No off-taker contract 
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The secondary data will cover the parameters above and come from public web 
source. Also, this research will implement semi-structured interview to have a 
more rounded view regarding to the third and fourth objective. This gives the 
opportunity to discuss about demand risk issue in depth and complement the 
result of quantitative approach. The way to implement interview would be internet-
based or telephone interview. The interviewees are project finance specialists 
engaging in project finance for transport and power sectors as equity, debt 
providers or infrastructure funds. Appendix A contains the collection of questions 
of semi-structured interview. The questions are divided into three themes that are 
evaluation of demand risk (Theme 1), difference of transport and power sector in 
terms of demand risk (Theme 2), and financial cost (Theme 3) to address the 




3.3 Framework for data analysis 
3.3.1 Data analysis method 
In quantitative analysis, this research will use a multiple regression model in 
SPSS for establishing the relationship between risk factors’ variables and debt-
equity ratio for transport and power sector separately.  
As discussed in 2.2, the risk factors could have an impact on capital structure 
(debt-equity ratio), and the degree of impact can be measured by the regression 
coefficient. In this research, the significant level is either 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01. If p-
value is smaller than the above criteria, the null hypothesis can be rejected and 
a significant correlation can be established. 
This research will implement qualitative analysis for complementing in parallel 
the result of quantitative analysis for objective 3 and 4. Comparing the result of 
quantitative and qualitative analysis to give a rich picture about objective 3 and 
4. 
 
3.3.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
This research conducted 6 semi-structured interviews with PPP/PFI experts in 
July 2020, including two interviewees from banks, two interviewees from equity 
investor, one from debt fund, one from equity fund. One interviewee has 
experience as both equity investor and debt provider, and gave both perspectives 




Chapter 4 Findings, and Analysis 
4.1 Quantitative analysis 
4.1.1 Data description 
This study has 66 mega-projects in EMDEs from publicly data sources between 
1995 and 2019 (Power project is 46 and Transport project 20). However, this data 
includes some outliers, such as 100% debt and long construction/operation 
period, and this study excludes them. Thus, power project is 43 and transport 
projects 14, and 2 power projects and 6 transport projects are brownfield 
(Appendix B). 
Transport megaprojects tend to be higher demand risk than power megaprojects 
and other figures are relatively similar (Table 5). The mean score of demand risk 
in transport megaprojects is mostly less than half of the power megaprojects and 
its standard deviation is mostly same. This means that SPVs in power 
megaprojects tend to be able to hedge demand risk compared to transport 
megaprojects. Although other risks are similar between transport and power 
sectors, political, construction, supply risks in transport sector was slightly smaller 
than power megaprojects. Particularly, there is no supply risk in transport 
megaprojects. This is because most of transport megaprojects involved a local 
construction firm as a construction subcontractor, and so the project is expected 
to have no supply risk. While financial risk in transport sector tends to be slightly 
higher than power sector. In terms of operation risk, the operation period is slightly 
longer in power megaprojects than in transport megaprojects while the score of 
experience as a main operator is slightly higher in transport than power 
megaprojects. Therefore, it is impossible to decide whether operation risk is 
higher in transport or power sector. Also, standard deviation in operation period 
of transport sector is high because transport sector includes various types of 
projects, such as toll road, port and airport projects. Inclusion of various projects 
types, which have different contractual characteristics, may cause the high 
standard deviation of the operation period in transport megaprojects. In terms of 
debt equity ratio, transport sector is slightly higher than power sector but the 
difference is relatively small. So, SPV of transport and power sectors tend be 













   Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Debt equity ratio 2.91 1.61 3.14 1.76 
Political risk S&P rating 5.91 0.94 6.23 0.54 













25.67 3.28 23.64 5.54 
Experience of 
main operator 




1.81 0.50 2.00 0.00 




4.1.2 Analysis using Multiple Linear Regression 
This study uses forward (Step-up) selection procedure to find the best model to 
describe the relationship between debt equity ratio and risk factors. Before 
implementing forward selection, multicollinearity should be investigated. If 
variables have multicollinearity, the model does not describe which independent 
variables are uniquely related to the depend variable.  
Some of the independent variables show multicollinearity (Table 6). In power 
sector, construction period, operation period, and demand risk show significant 
correlations with debt-equity ratio. Although operation period has significant 
correlations with financial risk and construction subcontractor financial strength, 
and demand risk also has significant correlations with financial risk and operation 
experience score. Therefore, the operation period and demand risk variables 
have multicollinearity. In transport sector, construction risk (construction period 
and construction subcontractor financial strength) shows a significant correlation 
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with debt-equity ratio. However, construction period has significant correlations 
with construction subcontractor financial strength and demand risk (Table 7). 
Thus, the construction risk variables in transport sector also have multicollinearity. 
Multiple linear regression model through forward selection demonstrates that 
demand risk and financial risk have a significant relationship with debt-equity ratio 
in power megaprojects, while transport sector has no significant relationship 
between debt-equity ratio and any risk variables (Table 8). In power megaprojects, 
model 1 to 6 shows a statistically significant relationship and the model 3 could 
be the best because it has the smallest p-value and the largest adjusted R 
squared. In model 3, demand risk has a significant positive correlation with debt-
equity ratio and its coefficient is 0.423. This means that low demand risk (high 
score in this research) leads to a high debt-equity ratio. Also, financial risk shows 
a significant negative correlation with debt-equity ratio and its coefficient is -0.323. 
This indicates that a high financial risk leads to a low debt equity ratio. However, 
demand risk and financial risk are statistically positively correlated (Table 6), and 
its coefficient is 0.389. Thus, although demand and financial risk is not uniquely 
related to debt equity ratio, these risks are statistically related to debt equity ratio. 
Thus, in terms of demand risk and financial risk in power sector, null hypothesis 
can be rejected and there is the significant correlation. Also, demand risk shows 
the highest coefficient in the models in power sector. However, the model 3 has 
a small adjusted r squared around 0.156 even though the model is statistically 
significant. This indicates that this model identifies the significant relationships 
between debt equity ratio and demand and financial risk but its accuracy is low. 
Conversely, transport sector cannot have a significant correlation between debt-
equity ratio and any risk variables. Thus, this research cannot reject null 
hypothesis in transport sector. 
26 
 
















Supply risk Demand risk 
Debt equity ratio 1.000 -0.003 -0.085 -0.239* 0.159 -0.201* 0.016 -0.029 0.33** 
Political risk   1.000 -0.145 -0.067 0.397*** -0.236 0.435*** 0.416*** -0.197 
Financial risk     1.000 0.054 0.095 -0.302** 0.057 -0.131 0.389*** 
Construction 
period 




        1.000 -0.357** 0.103 -0.047 -0.007 
Operation  
period 
          1.000 -0.021 0.020 -0.131 
Operation 
experience score 
            1.000 0.349** 0.249* 
Supply risk               1.000 0.040 
Demand risk                 1.000 




















Supply risk Demand risk 
Debt equity ratio 1.000 -0.153 -0.199 -0.364* -0.372* 0.221 0.186 0.000 -0.335 
Political risk   1.000 0.062 -0.187 0.152 -0.066 -0.038 0.000 -0.175 
Financial risk     1.000 0.4* 0.118 0.355 -0.475** 0.000 -0.142 
Construction 
period 




        1.000 0.177 0.203 0.000 0.247 
Operation  
period 
          1.000 -0.330 0.000 0.293 
Operation 
experience score 
            1.000 0.000 -0.240 
Supply risk               1.000 0.000 
Demand risk                 1.000 




Table 8: MLR models (Upside: Power, Downside: Transport) 
 
1 0.372 0.139 0.067 1.930 0.19 - - - -0.372 - - - - 
2 0.473 0.223 0.082 1.582 0.249 - - - -0.425 0.296 - - - 
3 0.625 0.390 0.208 2.135 0.159 - - - -0.546 0.466 0.451 - - 
4 0.673 0.453 0.211 1.867 0.201 - - - -0.473 0.513 0.385 - -0.276 
5 0.716 0.513 0.208 1.684 0.244 - -0.327 - -0.378 0.592 0.204 - -0.413 
6 0.754 0.569 0.199 1.538 0.292 - -0.529 0.474 -0.578 0.653 0.256 - -0.684 
7 0.754 0.569 0.066 1.130 0.449 -0.014 -0.526 0.463 -0.569 0.651 0.251 - -0.682 
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 























1 0.33 0.109 0.087 4.996 0.031 - - - - - - - 0.33** 
2 0.403 0.162 0.120 3.868 0.029 - -0.251 - - - - - 0.427*** 
3 0.465 0.216 0.156 3.582 0.022 - -0.323* - - -0.244 - - 0.423*** 
4 0.478 0.229 0.148 2.820 0.038 - -0.299* -0.119 - -0.217 - - 0.399** 
5 0.491 0.241 0.139 2.353 0.06 - -0.3* -0.117 0.119 -0.174 - - 0.406** 
6 0.501 0.251 0.127 2.015 0.089 - -0.304* -0.124 0.132 -0.167 -0.105 - 0.434** 
7 0.504 0.254 0.105 1.701 0.141 - -0.313* -0.124 0.128 -0.17 -0.85 -0.054 0.434** 
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4.2 Data collected for Qualitative analysis 
This research conducted 6 interviews with PPP/PFI experts in July 2020, 
including two interviewees from banks, two interviewees from equity investor, one 
from debt fund, one from equity fund. One interviewee has experience as both 
equity investor and debt provider, and gave both perspectives during the interview. 
Table 9 shows the codes representing the interviewees’ answers to the elements 
decomposed from the themes, and the number of their answers. 
 
4.2.1 Evaluation of demand risk 
Most of interviewees accept demand risk while they are reluctant to invest 
greenfield projects with demand risk. 4 out of 6 interviewees’ answer is to accept 
demand risk while one interviewee does not accept it (Table 9). 5 out of 6 
interviewees expressed that there is no incentive to take greenfield projects with 
demand risk. Also, one equity investor whose main business is airport and railway 
answered that there is limited number of infrastructure projects without demand 
risk. Additionally, equity funder who can accept demand risk stated that there is 
the maximum limit as the firm policy and a certain amount of the fund can be 
invested in the projects with demand risk. 
The motivation of investment in infrastructure projects is not just for the return 
from its investment. One equity investor interviewed explained that we require the 
stable cash flow when we decide to invest infrastructure projects to diversify our 
portfolio.  
In terms of the way to evaluate demand risk, worst-case scenario is important for 
the decision to invest and infrastructure market and economic variables are 
technically important factor to analyse demand risk. All interviewees treat worst-
case scenario as important factor to evaluate demand risk. One equity investor 
explained that worst-case analysis is used to check break-even point where cash 
crunch would occur and another equity investor said that the need to check a 
worst-case scenario is to get the finance from senior lender who conduct worst-
case analysis. A worst-case analysis illustrates the probability and need of 
additional investment and is one factor for the decision of senior lenders. 
Additionally, 3 out of 4 equity holders pointed out that infrastructure market 
condition and economic factors are important for demand evaluation. 
Infrastructure market condition can change the demand greatly because the 
competitive infrastructure surrounding the area can affect the traffic volume and 
shipments. Also, in terms of economic variables, the two equity investors 
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explained that demand forecast is based on the outlook of economic variables 
which have correlation with traffic demand, such as GDP and inflation ratio. 
In terms of the impact of demand risk on capital structure, some of interviewees 
identified that cash flow analysis would decide the debt capacity of SPV while 
most of interviewees stated that risk evaluation does not affect the individual 
investment amount in SPV. One debt provider explained that high volatility needs 
high DSCR and so the debt size of SPV would be small if the project has a high 
demand risk. Thus, a SPV capital structure depends on DSCR which is calculated 
by cash flow analysis. While individual finance amount is decided by a different 
approach. 3 out of 6 interviewees explained that a finance decision for SPV is 
binary, whether the project is financeable or not. Two equity holders explained 
that the optimal investment amount is decided according to own financial portfolio 
and they seek the project which meet the preferable condition to invest. Thus, 
they tend not to change the amount to finance according to risk evaluations. This 
indicates that overall debt size can be decided by cash flow analysis and the 
individual decision of equity investment amount and loan amount is not based on 
risk evaluation. 
In terms of mitigation measure for demand risk, adequate market study (4 out of 
6), governments taking demand risk to some extent (4 out of 6) are popular 
answer in the interviews. Adequate market study includes a long-term traffic 
record and market maturity, which means that enough available information for 
demand forecast is significant. However, this factor can contribute to accuracy of 
demand forecast rather than mitigating demand risk. Thus, a brownfield project 
can give a more accurate forecast than a greenfield project. This could lead to no 
appetite to invest greenfield project as mentioned above. Also, three or two 
interviewees answered that government guarantee, availability payment contract, 
minimum income compensation and off-taker contract can mitigate the demand 
risk. These measures make the revenue of the project more predictable because 
these measures would fix project income to some extent. These measures can 
be categorized into sharing all or a part of demand risk with counterpart. 
Therefore, sharing demand risk is obviously popular way to mitigate the demand 
risk as a whole. And, minority answers are project having a wide range 
development, government regulation to guarantee the use of road, and 
involvement of public entities. In terms of project having a wide range 
development, the equity investor explained that the geographically broad range 
of a project could balance the demand fluctuation. Government regulation to 
guarantee the use of road is to limit the transport development surrounding region. 
The equity investor explained that the regulation can make traffic forecast easy 
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and more accurate. One debt provider agreed that involvement of public entities 
make the negotiation with governments easier.  
 
4.2.2 Difference of transport and power sector in terms of demand risk 
While the interviews show that there are some similarities of demand risk 
between transport and power sector, all interviewees agreed that a common 
difference is a difficulty of forecasting the demand risk accurately in transport 
projects. In the interviews, same three interviewees stated that the inaccuracy of 
traffic demand forecast derives from a high elasticity of demand with surrounding 
environment and low predictability of minimum demand, which is the different 
from power sector. And, one equity holder stated that traffic demand has a high 
elasticity with economic factors, such as GDP, which is different from power sector, 
and one debt provider said that low liquidity of traffic volume is a different point. 
In terms of low liquidity of traffic volume, the debt provider explained that 
electricity produced by power plants can be transmitted to anywhere as long as 
transmission lines are developed while traffic volume cannot be transferred into 
other area. 3 out of 6 interviewees also pointed out that hedging demand risk in 
power projects is a difference from transport projects, and one equity investor 
among them stated that there is an established contractual structure for power 
projects, such as power purchase agreement, which can be related to hedging 
demand risk. Additionally, one debt provider explained that minimum demand in 
merchant power project is high predictability under the condition where power 
capacity market is established, such as the United States. Thus, most of 
interviewees have an understanding of demand risk in transport project less 
stable than power project, and this is a major difference between transport and 
power sector. One equity holder pointed out a difference among transport sector, 
and urban railway projects tend to be much more difficult to forecast than toll road 
projects because urban planning and traffic forecast is unpredictable and 
complicated. 
Some similarities were also identified by some interviewees, one is changeable 
nature by the other factors (political matter and redundancy, GDP etc.). However, 
the degree of the elasticity of demand risk with the other factors is different as 
mentioned above. And, one debt provider and equity holder showed that demand 
risk in middle load power of merchant power project is similar with transport 
project in terms of their low predictability. Middle load change greatly according 




4.2.3 Financial costs and risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation can affect financial cost through rating SPV. In the answers to 
Q3-1, all lenders interviewed answered that SPV rate, which is based on risk 
evaluation, decides interest rate roughly, and 2 out of them stated that market 
price of interest rate is also important to decide the interest rate. This indicated 
that interest rate level can be decided by SPV rate and then they adjust their loan 
price by comparing market price. Two lenders interviewed uses S&P or Moody’s 
rating system. Therefore, SPV rating system has been established procedure to 
price the loan. This rating system is applied to both transport and power projects, 
which all lenders interviewed agreed in Q3-2. However, risk evaluation obviously 
is different among projects and this reflected in SPV rating as one debt fund 
answered in Q3-2. Moreover, one debt provider suggested funding cost of lenders 
and internal target return as elements to decide the interest rate. In terms of 
financing cost of lenders, if lenders’ main market is not based on U.S. dollar or 
EURO, the cost of funding these major currencies is high for that lenders. Also, 
loan interest rate should meet the lender’s internal target return. These elements 
to affect loan pricing are not related to risk evaluation.  
In terms of the impact of demand risk on interest rate, all lenders agreed that the 
evaluation of demand risk incorporated into SPV rate which decides interest rate 
level. One debt provider’s answer is that a high volatility of demand leads to 
increase the interest rate. Interest rate would increase according to low SPV 
rating because of high demand risk. Thus, given that a high demand risk leads to 
a low debt equity ratio as mentioned in 4.2.1, a high demand risk results in the 
increase in financial cost of SPV by high loan price and low debt equity ratio. Also, 
the weight of risk evaluation differs from individual lender’s policy. According to 
the answers in Q3-7, two debt providers interviewed identified construction and 
demand risks as key risks and one interviewee stated that sponsor risk is also 
weighed on its rating system. 
Regarding the treatment of risk probability, all interviewees use three different 
scenarios to represent different risk probabilities in cash flow analysis. In one debt 
provider’s case, baseline risk probability is 50% percentile, optimistic case 75%, 
stress case 25% and worst-case 5%. Another deb provider stated that baseline 
scenario is used to rate SPV but internal assessment division emphases on 
worst-case scenario. Although equity investors also analyse cash flow in three 
cases and worst-case scenarios according to the answers to Q1-1b, the 
perspective of equity investors and debt providers is different. In the answer of 
one equity investor, debt providers do not analyse optimistic case because the 
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debt return does not change while equity investors can get a better profit when 
optimistic case. In terms of sensitive analysis, all lenders stated that they analyse 
the point where DSCR becomes one by changing variables in cash flow analysis. 
They analyse the impact of various variables on DSCR. Another explained that 
they focus on the worst-case scenario when they assess the project with demand 
risk, such as merchant power projects and transport projects. 
In terms of adjustment of optimism bias of demand forecast, all equity providers 
answered that scrutinising the report of consultant in neutral position is important 
while no lender made the same argument. Lenders do not scrutinise the accuracy 
of demand forecast compared to equity investors. Two equity investors stated 
that hired consultant would follow the contractor’s intention and then their forecast 
would be too optimistic. Additionally, the other equity investor illustrated that 
calculation of demand elasticity with economic variables varies greatly according 
to the choice of target period, and this elasticity can be overestimated. Thus, the 
calculation can be subjective. Also, 3 out of 6 interviewees stated that a downside 
analysis to check break-even reduce optimism bias. However, stress case 
analysis would be not enough to address optimism bias because these scenarios 
are based on the elasticity of traffic or power demand with economic variables 















Theme-1 Evaluation of demand risk      
1-1a. Acceptance of demand risk      
Accept demand risk   0 1 2 1 4 
Not accept demand risk   1 0 0 0 1 
No appetite for greenfield-projects with demand risk   1 1 2 1 5 
Accept demand risk but it depends on the target return   0 0 1 0 1 
PPP is normally no demand risk   0 1 0 0 1 
There is a maximum limit to accept demand risk   0 0 0 1 1 
Limited number of infrastructure projects without demand risk   0 1 0 0 1 
Accept demand risk because of need a better equity return   0 0 1 0 1 
1-1b. How to evaluate demand risk      
Focusing on worst-case scenario   2 0 3 1 6 
Based on demand forecast   0 1 3 1 5 
 
 Forecast is from three case scenario 0 0 1 1 2 
Focusing on infrastructure market supply and demand 
(Monopolised)   
0 0 2 1 3 
Using economic variable correlated to traffic volume   0 0 2 0 2 
Focusing on the conditions for next term PPA contract   0 0 0 1 1 




















1-2. The impact of demand risk on capital structure       
Binary (financeable or not)   0 1 1 1 3 
Debt capacity decided by cash flow analysis   1 0 1 0 2 
Risk evaluation does not affect investment amount   0 0 1 1 2 
Impact on concession fee and premium for bidding price   0 0 1 0 1 
Not much   0 1 0 0 1 
Possible   0 0 1 0 1 
Significant 
  
  1 0 0 0 1 
High volatility needs high DSCR 1 0 0 0 1 
1-3. Mitigation measure against demand risk      
Adequate market studies   1 1 2 0 4 
Government take risks to some extent   1 0 2 1 4 
Government guarantee   1 0 1 1 3 
Availability payment contract   1 0 1 0 2 
Minimum income compensation   1 0 1 0 2 
Off-taker contract   1 1 0 0 2 
A wide range development project   0 0 1 0 1 
Government regulation to guarantee the use of road   0 0 1 0 1 

















Theme-2. Difference of demand risk between transport and power sectors      





  2 1 3 0 6 
High elasticity of demand with 
surrounding environment 
2 0 1 0 3 
Low predictability of minimum demand 2 0 1 0 3 
High elasticity of demand with economic 
factors 
0 0 1 0 1 






  1 0 2 1 4 
Changeable nature by other factors 
(political matter and redundancy etc.) 
0 0 2 0 2 
Linked to GDP 0 0 0 1 1 
Merchant power projects and transport 
project is similar 
0 0 0 1 1 
Middle load in merchant power projects 
and traffic demand is similar 
1 0 0 0 1 
Hedging demand risk in power projects   1 0 2 0 3 
Difference within transport sector   0 0 1 0 1 
Established contractual structure for power projects 


















High certainty in minimum demand for power projects 
  
  1 0 0 0 1 
High predictability and liquidity 1 0 0 0 1 
Inaccuracy of power price forecast   0 1 0 0 1 
Various customers in transport sector   0 0 1 0 1 
Theme-3 Financial cost and risk evaluation      
3-1. The way to decide the interest rate for the project with demand risk       
Rating SPV   2 1 0 0 3 
Market price   2 0 0 0 2 
Financing cost of lenders   1 0 0 0 1 
Internal target return   1 0 0 0 1 
3-2. Difference of interest rate between transport and power sectors       
Same system   2 1 0 0 3 
Risks (construction and market) make a difference   0 1 0 0 1 
3-3. The impact of demand risk on interest rate       
Through SPV rating 
  
  
  2 1 0 0 3 
Same weight with other risks 1 0 0 0 1 
Weighing demand risk 1 0 0 0 1 
Volatility increases interest rate   1 0 0 0 1 
3-4. Loan pricing system in terms of risk probability and sensitive analysis       



















When DSCR becomes 1 by changing variables   2 0 0 0 2 
Credit rating methodology cover risk probability and sensitivity 
analysis   
0 1 0 0 
1 
3-5. Difference of the way to calculate risk probability between transport and power sectors       
Fluctuation of demand risk probability is smaller in power 
project   
1 0 0 0 
1 
More focus on worst case in projects with demand risk   1 0 0 0 1 
Same way to calculate but input could be different   0 1 0 0 1 
3-6. Adjustment of optimism bias of forecast       
Scrutinising the report of consultant in neutral position   0 0 3 1 4 
Downside analysis and stressing the breakeven   1 1 1 0 3 
Own information to be gathered   0 0 1 0 1 
3-7 Key risks for loan       
Construction risk   1 1 0 0 2 
Demand risk   1 1 0 0 2 
Sponsor risk   1 0 0 0 1 





4.3.1 Evaluation of risk variables with greatest impact on financing 
structure 
This research found that demand and financial risk greatly affects financing 
structure in power megaprojects. The multiple regression analysis confirms the 
statistically significant relationship of debt equity ratio with demand risk and 
financial risk in power megaprojects. Especially, demand risk is negatively 
correlated with debt equity ratio. And, in the qualitative analysis, most of the 
interviewees answered that cash flow analysis generally decides debt capacity of 
SPV. This argument follows the notion of Finnerty (2007) and Weber and Alfen 
(2010). The evaluation of demand risk is based on this cash flow analysis to 
calculate DSCR. High volatility requires a high DSCR and this leads to small debt 
capacity of SPV. Thus, the relationship of demand risk with capital structure in 
power megaproject is clearly established qualitatively and quantitatively while this 
study cannot find the relationship of political, construction, operation and supply 
risks with capital structure. As mentioned in Chapter 2.2., some researchers 
identified the relationship of political, construction, operation risks with debt-
equity ratio (CORIELLI et al., 2010; de Marco et al., 2017). This difference could 
derive from the fact that past research did not include demand risk to implement 
regression analysis.  
Financial risk has also a statistically significant negative correlation with capital 
structure in power megaprojects. However, demand and financial risk have 
multilinearity (Table 6). This is supported by the result of qualitative analysis. The 
qualitative analysis identified that demand forecast is based on elasticity of 
demand with economic factors, such as GDP and inflation rate. As analysed in 
Chapter 4.2.2., although the high elasticity of traffic demand is different point 
between transport and power sector, changeable nature by other factors is 
considered as a similarity (Theme 2, Table 9). Therefore, demand risk and 
financial risk can be correlated to some extent.  
Individual finance decision for SPV depends on evaluation of several risk factors, 
not only demand risk which decides the debt capacity of SPV. In qualitative 
analysis, an individual decision to finance a project is basically binary and risk 
evaluation does not affect individual investment or loan amount. Lenders and 
equity providers interviewed stated that evaluation of several risks is incorporated 
into SPV rating which decides the loan interest rate, and optimal investment 
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amount is set internally before investment. According to Moody’s investor service 
(2019) and Standard & Poor’s rating services (2014), obviously convers several 
risk factors besides demand risk. Owolabi et al. (2020) listed bankability criteria 
for SPV in their research and these criteria could be used to decision to finance, 
not for adjust the loan amount. Although Finnerty (2007) and Weber and Alfen 
(2010) stated that risk share structure and creditworthiness of parties are 
important factors for capital structure, these factors are also the elements for 
binary investment decision.  
Capital structures of both transport and power megaprojects reflect the difference 
of contractual structures and mitigation measure against demand risk. In terms 
of debt-equity ratio in transport and power projects, transport sector is mostly 
same as power sector even though its demand risk is higher than power sector 
and other risk factors’ scores are similar (Table 5). According to the notion above, 
high demand risk will decrease debt equity ratio. However, the result of 
quantitative analysis does not show the case. This could be because about half 
of transport megaprojects are brownfield while around 5% of power megaprojects 
are brownfield. In qualitative analysis, market study, including enough track 
record, is an important factor to make demand forecast convinced, and brownfield 
projects generally have track records. Therefore, financiers ensure stable cash 
flow because of the track records with the small volatility of traffic volume, and 
this results in the debt equity ratio to be mostly same as power megaprojects with 
the off-taker contract.  
 
4.3.2 Demand risk as a key factor for SPV 
Demand risk is an important factor for the decision to finance the infrastructure 
projects. In the result of quantitative analysis, the coefficient of demand risk with 
capital structure in power megaprojects is the highest. Thus, its impact on capital 
structure is high. Also, a project with low volatility is clearly preferable for lenders 
who tend to be conservative for risk. This is because senior lenders have a higher 
claim to the asset of SPV than equity investors (Zhang and Asce, 2005). The 
result of qualitative analysis illustrates that equity investors prefer an 
infrastructure project with low volatility because they tend to expect infrastructure 
investment as stable and need debt finance from lenders. Therefore, individual 
binary finance decision of both lenders and equity investors depends on the 
evaluation of demand risk. This reflected on one answer agreed by most 




Accuracy of demand forecast in transport sector is not high and optimism bias 
can affect its analysis. As mentioned, inaccuracy of demand forecast in traffic 
forecast is supported by most of interviewees. This follows the notion that actual 
traffic rarely matches the demand forecast (Flyvbjerg, 2008). However, financiers 
need to rely on the demand forecast to evaluate demand risk even though it would 
be inaccurate. This inaccuracy derives from optimism bias and elasticity of 
economic factors and changes in surrounding area (Flyvbjerg et al., 2007). The 
result of qualitative analysis illustrates that the causes of this bias are that the 
parameter of elasticity of traffic volume with economic variables depends on the 
choice of inputs, and the choice is subjective. Also, some equity investors 
interviewed stated that the consultants tend to analyse the demand in the way to 
follow the client’s intention. Flyvbjerg et al. (2007) also identified this point and 
policy-makers tend to overestimate demand forecast.  
In terms of mitigation measure for demand risk, more than half of interviewees 
answered that adequate market study including an enough historical track record 
is significant. However, existence of a long track record does not necessarily 
indicate an accurate demand forecast because of the optimism bias. The input of 
parameter is subjective and the demand forecast depends on it. This could be 
one of the reasons why accuracy of traffic volume forecast has not been improved 
for 30 years (Flyvbjerg et al., 2007). Therefore, most interviewees emphasise 
assessment of demand forecast in neutral perspective to reduce optimism bias. 
However, the assessment could address the optimism bias while its applicability 
of relationship between traffic demand and economic factors for a long-term could 
be doubt. Bull et al. (2015) stated that historical relationship may not be applicable 
to long term forecasting. Therefore, forecast of traffic demand includes the 
problems of long-term applicability and accuracy of inputs. Therefore, although 
adequate market study can help to accurate demand risk to some extent, the 
effectiveness of demand forecast for long-term could be unclear. Thus, the best 
way to mitigate demand risk for private investors and lenders is to share the 
demand risk with the governments or counterparts, such as availability payment 
contract, minimum income compensation, off-taker contract because a part or all 
revenue is fixed or easily estimated. These mitigation measures are supported 
by the most of interviewees. In this context, power projects are obviously 
preferable rather than transport projects because the contractual structure has 





4.3.3 The relationships between capital structure and risk factors in terms 
of impact via financing costs 
Both capital structure and risk evaluation can affect the financial cost of SPV 
directly, and here demand risk also is the key factor. The evaluation of demand 
risk has an impact on the capital structure of SPV as mentioned above. High 
demand risk would decrease the leverage of SPV and its financial cost would 
increase theoretically. This is because cost of equity generally is higher than cost 
of debt (Zhang and Asce, 2005). However, cost of the debt is not decided solely 
by capital structure. The result of qualitative analysis shows that SPV rating 
system would decide interest rate of loan roughly. This SPV rating is based on 
various risk evaluations, such as construction risk, sponsor risk, cash flow risk 
(demand risk), and its weight is different from the rating model, such as Moody’s 
and S&P. Additionally, there is no difference of the way to rate SPV between 
transport and power sector. Thus, transport sector might be high cost of debt 
because this sector has inaccuracy of traffic demand and tend to have no 
contractual structure to hedge demand risk, which is shown in high demand risk 
in Table 5 regardless of the similar debt-equity ratios of power and transport 
megaprojects. Final loan price would be decided by referring to market price 
which most of debt providers interviewed agreed to. This is supported by Blanc-
Brude and Strange (2007) and they stated that practitioners argued that cost of 
debt is from market price. Loan prices offered are obviously different among debt 
providers because its funding cost and target internal return are different even 
though SPV rate would be similar. This might be the case because some debt 
providers would use the established rating model, such as S&P and Moody’s. 
Thus, funding cost and target internal return might make a difference of loan price, 
and sponsors would choose the best loan price among them. 
Interest rate would not represent risk probability fully. When considering demand 
risk, the qualitative analysis illustrates that the cash flow analysis uses optimistic, 
baseline, stress and worst-case scenarios and the analysis illustrates the 
demand risk probability and the degree of sensitivity of variables. This means that 
lenders generally do not use a statistical tool to represent risk probability, such as 
Monte Carlo Simulation, to analyse the demand risk. Additionally, the S&P model 
uses downside analysis to evaluate market and performance risks (Standard & 
Poor’s rating services, 2014) and the Moody’s model also uses minimum DSCR 
when the cash flow volatility is high (Moody’s investor service, 2019). These 
rating models are popular to use among lenders in this research interviews. Thus, 
demand risk evaluation in SPV rating depends on one case scenario and does 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
5.1 Overall 
This research used quantitative and qualitative approaches to evaluate the 
relationship between capital structure and risk evaluation and the role of demand 
risk in the context of capital structure and financial cost. And, this study focuses 
on power and transport projects over 1 billion dollars in Asian EMDEs.  
This research illustrated that some risk factors are correlated with capital 
structure. However, the finding is different from past researches (CORIELLI et al., 
2010; de Marco et al., 2017). In power sector, demand risk and financial risk have 
a statistically significant correlation with capital structure in megaprojects in Asian 
EMDEs. Also, the correlation between demand risk and financial risk was found 
through multiple linear regression modelling process and this relationship could 
be confirmed empirically by interviews. In terms of the impact of demand risk on 
capital structure, cash flow analysis (Demand risk evaluation) can decide the debt 
capacity of SPV. Also, this report identified that transport sector tends to be higher 
demand risk than power sector quantitively and qualitatively. However, their debt-
equity ratios were similar from 1995 to 2019, and this research concluded that 
this similarity could derive from a high ratio of brownfield projects in transport 
sector. The interviews implemented identified that the market study including long 
track record was important element to make demand forecast convinced and 
reduce the demand risk to some extent. Additionally, this research found that 
infrastructure investments without demand risk are preferable. This is not only for 
lenders who tend to be conservative but also equity investors because equity 
investors need debt finance from lenders to form SPV and seek stable 
investments to diversify their portfolio. 
This study recognised demand risk as a key for finance decision for both equity 
investors and debt providers. Quantitative analysis shows that the impact of 
demand risk evaluation on debt-equity ratio is high and qualitative analysis 
illustrates that the individual finance decision with binary nature depends on 
demand risk evaluation. Additionally, looking at differences of demand risk 
between transport and power sectors, inaccuracy of demand in transport sector 
and hedging demand risk in power projects are suggested in interviews, and 
descriptive analysis shows high demand risk in transport sector (Table 5). Also, 
all equity holders agreed that optimism bias exists in demand forecast and the 
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root of the bias is the business custom of the consultants that follow the sponsors’ 
intention. Additionally, the parameters of demand forecast have high elasticity 
with economic factors which are subjective. In terms of mitigation measure to 
demand risk, the research concluded that sharing demand risk with counterpart 
and governments is the best way for private investors and lenders while most of 
interviewees agreed to adequate market study to mitigate demand risk. However, 
the existence of long track record cannot address optimism bias because some 
input parameter for demand forecast can be subjective. 
Capital structure and risk evaluations, especially demand risk, affect the financial 
cost of SPV. Excessively high leverage increases cost of debt and risk evaluation 
increases loan interest rate through SPV rating. The rating models have been 
established, such as Moody’s and S&P rating models, and this could result in 
similar SPV rate among lenders. Additionally, other factors, such as funding cost 
of lenders and internal target interest rate, practically affect loan price and these 
costs would make loan price different. Also, interest rate does not represent 
demand risk probability completely because SPV rating rely on downside or 
worst-case scenario. This means that the interest rate may be excessively 
conservative. 
5.2 Recommendation 
There are some limitations of this study that are small number of transport 
megaprojects in quantitative approach and the small interviewees number. This 
study gathers secondary data from publicly sources and its target megaprojects 
are from 1995 to 2019 in Asian EMDEs, but could not gather the information about 
megaprojects in transport sector because PPP transport projects over $1 billion 
were still minor in Asian EMDEs. And, some information related to contract were 
not open. Additionally, transport sector is relatively wide definition because this 
sector includes road, port and airport which have different nature in terms of 
demand and contract. These factors might result in no statistically significant 
relationship between capital structure and risk factors in transport megaprojects. 
Additionally, the number of interviewees was 6 and 5 professionals were from 
Japanese firms, and so some information given in the interviews were possibly 
specific for the Japanese investor, lender or fund.  
The relationship of risk evaluation with capital structure in transport megaprojects 
should be investigated quantitatively to find the difference from power sector in 
terms of the impact of risk factors on capital structure. Gathering adequate 
number of subjects could be a key to analyse it fully. To gather information from 
46 
 
publicly sources has limitation, especially transport sector where the 
megaprojects number is small. However, if the relationship can be established, 
the financial and embedded risk nature and characteristics of transport 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
THEME 1 – Evaluation of demand risk 
 
Question Generic risk 
Transport  
Power 
What is your [investment appraisal] approach to demand risk?  
In each of the questions below, please indicate in the right column if your answer is generic, or 
linked specifically to the transport or the power sector 
1 When considering infrastructure 
investments, do you accept 
demand risk? 
a) If yes, how would you evaluate 
it? 
b) If no, do you simply exclude 
investing in any project where it’s 
present? 
  
2 (If you answered ”yes” to the Q1 
above) To what extent does your 
evaluation of demand risk have a 
significant impact on the quantum 






3 Whether your answer to Q1 above 
was Y or N, what do you consider 
the possible factors (ranked) to 




THEME 2 – Difference of transport and power sector in terms of demand risk 
 
Question 
What aspects of demand risk do you believe are similar or differentiated as between 
transport and power sector investments in PPP megaprojects? 
 
e.g. traffic flow forecasts are notoriously varied due to factors such as 
optimism bias; while power consumption forecasts are frequently state-







THEME 3 – Financial costs (For lenders) 
 
Question 
1 Debt capital needs to reflect the 
risks that are inherent in a 
megaproject, so how do you 
decide the interest rate margins 
for a project financing involving 
demand risk?  
 
2 Do you consider different 
margins apply in the transport 
sector from the power industry? 
If yes, could you expand the way 
you apply to? 
 
3 To what extent does your own 
evaluation of risk have a 
significant impact on the 
interest rate margin for a PPP 
megaproject finance? 
 
4 When considering the pricing 
for a loan  
4.1 do you have a system as to 
prioritising risk factors via a 
sensitivity analysis and 
include the risk probability 
within your cash flow 
analysis for the interest rate 
charged for PPP megaproject 
finance? if yes, please 




4.2 Do you apply different 
calculations of risk 
probability according to the 
project’s sector (transport vs 
power, etc)? if yes, please 
expand within your answer 
 
 
5 When demand risk is accepted 
within a loan arrangement, do 
you take into account any 
adjustment for optimism bias 
by the forecasts? 
 
6 Please add any comments 
and/or descriptions of what you 
consider are key risks to be 
“priced into” the loan 





Appendix B: Data set from publicly source developed from mainly world bank data base  








Political risk Financial risk Construction risk Operation risk Supply risk Demand risk 












1 India Bangalore Kempegowda International Airport Expansion - Phase II Brownfield Airports 2019 1890 4 6.6 4.86% 3 0.15 10 2 2 0 0 
2 India Navi Mumbai International Airport Greenfield project Airports 2018 2359 2.33333 6.6 2.49% 25 1.07 27 2 2 0 1 
3 India Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport  Brownfield Airports 2006 1483 2.17559 5.9 4.25% 8 0.45 28 2 2 1 0 
4 India Indira Gandhi International Airport Brownfield Airports 2006 2183 1.25 5.9 4.25% 4 0.66 31 2 2 0 0 
5 Philippines Mactan-Cebu International Airport Greenfield project Airports 2015 1023.9 2.33333 6.6 3.60% 3 1.40 22 2 2 0 0 
6 Malaysia Pengerang Terminal Phase II Greenfield project Ports 2017 1543 4.26316 7.3 2.09% 5 1.84 25 2 2 0 1 
7 India L&T Hyderabad Metro Rail Private Limited Greenfield project Railways 2011 3639.5 2 6.3 11.99% 5 0.36 30 1 2 1 0 
8 India Mumbai Metro - Phase II Greenfield project Railways 2011 2514.8 2.7037 6.3 11.99% 5 2.93 30 2 2 1 0 
9 Indonesia Jakarta Bandung High-Speed Railway Greenfield project Railways 2017 6000 3 6.3 3.53% 5 0.07 45 2 0 0 0 
10 Philippines Light Rail Transit 1 (LRT 1) Cavite Extension Greenfield project Railways 2016 1125 0.64063 6.3 0.67% 5 0.10 27 2 2 0 0 
11 Philippines Manila Metro Rail Transit Line 7 (MRT-7) Greenfield project Railways 2016 1287 100 6.3 0.67% 5 3.29 20 2 2 0 0 
12 Thailand Bangkok Transit System Corporation (BTSC) Greenfield project Railways 1995 1700 2 7.6 5.05% 6 4.42 24 1 2 0 0 
13 India GMR Kishangarh Udaipur Ahmedabad Expressway Limited  Brownfield Roads 2012 3380.5 2.33333 6.3 8.86% 3 0.29 26 2 2 0 0 
14 India IRB Ahmedabad Vadodara Super Express Tollway Private Limited Brownfield Roads 2012 1848.7 2.125 6.3 8.86% 4 3.92 21 2 2 0 0 
15 India Jaypee Infratech Limited (Yamuna Expressway) Greenfield project Roads 2010 1753.8 1.63158 6.3 10.88% 5 44.17 30 2 2 0 0 
16 India L&T BPP Tollway Limited  Brownfield Roads 2013 1256 3 6.3 9.31% 3 0.09 20 2 2 0 0 
17 Indonesia Cikampek - Palimanan Toll Road  Greenfield project Roads 2012 1300 2.33333 5.9 5.36% 3 1.43 32 2 2 0 0 
18 Indonesia Cisumdawu Toll Road Greenfield project Roads 2012 1362 9 5.9 5.36% 3 0.08 32 2 2 0 0 
19 Indonesia Jalan Tol Jakarta-Cikampek II Greenfield project Roads 2018 1126.38 2.33333 6.3 3.81% 4 1.92 41 2 2 0 0 
*Shading rows include outlier number 
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20 Philippines Cavite-Laguna Expressway (CALAX) Greenfield project Roads 2019 1046 0.78571 6.6 5.21% 5 0.89 30 1 2 0 0 
21 India Adani Maharashtra Power Limited  Greenfield project Electricity 2009 1913.4 0 6.3 8.35% 4 3.21 25 2 2 0 1 
22 India Essar Power MP Limited Greenfield project Electricity 2009 1104.1 3 6.3 8.35% 4 3.23 21 2 2 0 1 
23 India Jhajjar Power Limited  Greenfield project Electricity 2009 1503.6 1.85714 6.3 8.35% 3 2.78 22 2 1 0 1 
24 India Kamalanga Thermal Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2009 1053 0.81818 6.3 8.35% 4 0.61 25 2 2 0 1 
25 India KSK Mahanadi Power Co Ltd Greenfield project Electricity 2011 3535.3 4.88235 6.3 11.99% 2 1.28 15 2 2 1 1 
26 India Mundra Thermal Power Project Greenfield project Electricity 2009 1851 3.34783 6.3 8.35% 5 5.56 20 2 1 0 1 
27 India Prayagraj Power Generation Co. Ltd. Greenfield project Electricity 2010 2514.76 3 6.3 10.88% 7 1.04 25 2 2 1 1 
28 India Sasan Ultra Mega Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2009 3985.8 3 6.3 8.35% 4 1.84 25 2 2 0 1 
29 India Sterlite Jharsuguda Power Project Greenfield project Electricity 2009 1707 3 6.3 8.35% 4 1.89 25 2 2 0 1 
30 India Maithon Right Bank Power Project Greenfield project Electricity 2008 1042 2.33333 6.3 6.37% 3 0.19 30 2 2 0 1 
31 India Mundra Ultra Mega Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2008 4200 2.30709 6.3 6.37% 6 3.64 25 2 2 0 1 
32 India Anpara C Thermal Power Station Greenfield project Electricity 2007 1100 2.33333 5.9 5.80% 5 2.95 25 2 2 0 1 
33 India Essar Power Gujarat Limited (Jamnagar Power Plant) Greenfield project Electricity 2008 1129 3 6.3 6.37% 2 4.32 25 2 2 0 1 
34 Indonesia Cirebon 2 Coal - Fired Power Plant Brownfield Electricity 2017 2175 4 6.3 3.53% 5 0.14 25 2 2 0 1 
35 Indonesia Java 7 Power Station Greenfield project Electricity 2016 1800 100 5.9 6.36% 3 0.06 25 2 1 0 1 
36 Indonesia Jawa 1 FSRU & CCGT Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2018 1770 2.84615 6.3 3.81% 3 0.68 25 2 2 0 1 
37 Indonesia Paiton III Thermal Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2010 1450 5.17021 5.6 4.39% 2 0.69 30 2 2 1 1 
38 Indonesia PT Medco Sarulla Geothermal Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2012 1540 3 5.9 5.36% 4 0.14 30 2 2 1 1 
39 Indonesia Tanjung Jati B Coal-Fired Power Plant (Units 5 & 6) Brownfield Electricity 2017 4194 4 6.3 3.53% 4 2.02 25 2 2 0 1 
*Shading rows include outlier number 
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40 Lao PDR Nam Ngum III HPP Greenfield project Electricity 2012 1200 2.0303 4.3 7.57% 5 0.27 27 2 2 1 1 
41 Lao PDR Nam Theun I Greenfield project Electricity 2017 1300 2.57143 4.3 1.60% 4 1.34 27 2 2 0 1 
42 Lao PDR Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy HPP Greenfield project Electricity 2014 1046 2.44828 4.3 6.37% 5 0.14 27 0 1 0 0 
43 Lao PDR Nam Theun II Hydropower Project Greenfield project Electricity 2005 1250 2.57143 4.3 10.46% 5 1.63 25 2 1 1 1 
44 Malaysia 3B Jimah East Coal-Fired Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2015 2675 2.33333 7.3 3.14% 3 0.16 25 2 2 0 1 
45 Malaysia Tanjung Bin Power Plant  Greenfield project Electricity 2012 2122 4 7.3 3.17% 4 4.72 25 2 2 0 1 
46 Malaysia Jimah Energy Greenfield project Electricity 2005 1600 24 6.9 1.42% 5 0.12 25 1 2 0 1 
47 Pakistan China Power Hub Generation Company Greenfield project Electricity 2017 1940 3.34783 4.6 3.77% 3 0.11 20   2 0 1 
48 Pakistan Engro Thar Coal-Fired Power Plant Phase 1 Greenfield project Electricity 2016 1108 3 4.6 2.53% 4 0.37 20 2 2 0 1 
49 Pakistan Karot Hydropower Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2017 1700 4 4.6 3.77% 5 0.39 30 1 2 0 1 
50 Pakistan Lucky Electric Coal Power Greenfield project Electricity 2018 1080 3 4.6 4.09% 4 0.42 30 2 2 1 1 
51 Pakistan Matiari-Lahore Transmission Line Greenfield project Electricity 2019 1658 4 4.3 5.08% 3 1.54 25 1 0 0 1 
52 Pakistan Suki Kinari Hydropower Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2017 1888.2 3 4.6 3.77% 5 0.11 30 1 0 0 1 
53 Pakistan Hub Power Company Greenfield project Electricity 1994 1632 3 4.9 9.97% 4 0.19 26 1 2 1 1 
54 Philippines San Buenaventura Coal-Fired Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2015 1195.05 3 6.6 3.60% 4 0.12 20 2 2 0 1 
55 Philippines San Roque Hydropower Project Greenfield project Electricity 1998 1100 3 5.9 5.59% 5 0.54 25 2 2 0 0 
56 Philippines Sual Pangasinan Coal-Fired Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 1995 1400 3.54545 5.3 10.39% 3 75.42 22 2 2 0 1 
57 Thailand Chonburi Natural Gas Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2018 1534.4 3 6.9 0.67% 3 2.50 25 2 2 0 1 
58 Thailand Gulf PD Natural Gas-Fired Combined Cycle Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2019 1653.34 1.53067 6.9 1.06% 4 1.95 25 2 2 0 1 
59 Thailand Gulf Utai Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2012 1280 0.88679 6.9 3.81% 3 2.73 25 2 2 1 1 
*Shading rows include outlier number 
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60 Thailand Nong Saeng IPP Greenfield project Electricity 2011 1185 10.1111 6.9 3.25% 3 3.87 25 2 2 1 1 
61 Thailand BLCP Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2003 1300 4.55556 6.3 0.70% 3 0.06 22 2 2 0 0 
62 Thailand GHECO-One coal-fired power plant Greenfield project Electricity 2008 1150 1.85714 6.9 2.24% 3 0.08 25 2 2 0 1 
63 Vietnam Duyen Hai 2 Thermal Power Plant Greenfield project Electricity 2017 2400 3 5.3 2.67% 4 4.64 25 1 2 0 1 
64 Vietnam Mong Duong II Thermal Power Generation Project Greenfield project Electricity 2011 1950 2.98773 5.3 9.21% 4 0.13 25 2 2 1 1 
65 Vietnam Nghi Son 2 Greenfield project Electricity 2018 1869 100 5.3 3.52% 4 0.10 25 2 2 0 1 
66 Vietnam Van Phong 1 coal-fired power plant Greenfield project Electricity 2019 2675 2.90511 5.3 3.54% 4 0.04 25 2 2 0 1 
 
 
Data source table 
No. Project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Bangalore Kempegowda International Airport Expansion - Phase II Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
2 Navi Mumbai International Airport Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
3 Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
4 Indira Gandhi International Airport Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
5 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
6 Pengerang Terminal Phase II Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
7 L&T Hyderabad Metro Rail Private Limited Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
8 Mumbai Metro - Phase II Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
*Shading rows include outlier number 
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9 Jakarta Bandung High-Speed Railway Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
10 Light Rail Transit 1 (LRT 1) Cavite Extension Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7 Source 8   
11 Manila Metro Rail Transit Line 7 (MRT-7) Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
12 Bangkok Transit System Corporation (BTSC) Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
13 GMR Kishangarh Udaipur Ahmedabad Expressway Limited  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
14 IRB Ahmedabad Vadodara Super Express Tollway Private Limited Source 1 Source 2 Source 3             
15 Jaypee Infratech Limited (Yamuna Expressway) Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
16 L&T BPP Tollway Limited  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
17 Cikampek - Palimanan Toll Road  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
18 Cisumdawu Toll Road Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
19 Jalan Tol Jakarta-Cikampek II Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
20 Cavite-Laguna Expressway (CALAX) Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
21 Adani Maharashtra Power Limited  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
22 Essar Power MP Limited Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
23 Jhajjar Power Limited  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
24 Kamalanga Thermal Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
25 KSK Mahanadi Power Co Ltd Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
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26 Mundra Thermal Power Project Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
27 Prayagraj Power Generation Co. Ltd. Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
28 Sasan Ultra Mega Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7 Source 8   
29 Sterlite Jharsuguda Power Project Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7 Source 8 Source 9 
30 Maithon Right Bank Power Project Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
31 Mundra Ultra Mega Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7 Source 8 Source 9 
32 Anpara C Thermal Power Station Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
33 Essar Power Gujarat Limited (Jamnagar Power Plant) Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
34 Cirebon 2 Coal - Fired Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
35 Java 7 Power Station Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
36 Jawa 1 FSRU & CCGT Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
37 Paiton III Thermal Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
38 PT Medco Sarulla Geothermal Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
39 Tanjung Jati B Coal-Fired Power Plant (Units 5 & 6) Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
40 Nam Ngum III HPP Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
41 Nam Theun I Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
42 Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy HPP Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
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43 Nam Theun II Hydropower Project Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
44 3B Jimah East Coal-Fired Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
45 Tanjung Bin Power Plant  Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
46 Jimah Energy Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
47 China Power Hub Generation Company Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
48 Engro Thar Coal-Fired Power Plant Phase 1 Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
49 Karot Hydropower Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
50 Lucky Electric Coal Power Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4           
51 Matiari-Lahore Transmission Line Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
52 Suki Kinari Hydropower Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
53 Hub Power Company Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
54 San Buenaventura Coal-Fired Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
55 San Roque Hydropower Project Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
56 Sual Pangasinan Coal-Fired Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
57 Chonburi Natural Gas Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
58 Gulf PD Natural Gas-Fired Combined Cycle Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3             
59 Gulf Utai Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
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60 Nong Saeng IPP Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
61 BLCP Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7     
62 GHECO-One coal-fired power plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6       
63 Duyen Hai 2 Thermal Power Plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Source 6 Source 7 Source 8   
64 Mong Duong II Thermal Power Generation Project Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
65 Nghi Son 2 Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
66 Van Phong 1 coal-fired power plant Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5         
 
